Fluidkey said on Sunday that an attacker made unauthorized transfers from 52 accounts on November 19, “totalling approximately $1.6 million,” after exploiting two unpatched flaws in SigNoz, a third-party logging tool it ran on its own servers. The transfers ran between 17:28 and 18:05 UTC, when the company took transaction processing offline. Fluidkey said the private keys that control user funds never left users’ devices; the post-mortem describes the attacker using session tokens from internal logs to prepare transfers that the app then signed when users unlocked it. The company said the investigation is ongoing and that it will update the report as its findings develop.
How the transfers were signed
According to the post-mortem, some Fluidkey services had written users’ session tokens to SigNoz logs, and the logs also held viewing keys for some recently registered accounts. “With these tokens the attacker created transfer requests on our servers and marked them as approved.” The attacker also used the tokens to raise two-factor spending limits.
Because the keys stay on the device, “a prepared transfer could not execute by itself.” That limitation did not stop the transfers. “The attacker sent small payments to trigger a notification. When a user then opened and unlocked the app, the app signed the prepared transfer, as it does for transfers the user has approved.”
The first unauthorized transfer came at 17:28 UTC. An affected user reached support at 17:43 UTC, engineering began shutting down transaction processing at 17:54 UTC, and the company said processing was fully offline at 18:05 UTC, with no new unauthorized transactions after that. At 18:12 UTC it opened an emergency ticket with SEAL 911. Fluidkey says it came back online on November 20 at 15:27 UTC with version 1.79.22, and it announced the restore on X about 45 minutes later, after the apps had been taken offline during the incident.
The SigNoz flaws
The attacker, Fluidkey said, “exploited two vulnerabilities in SigNoz” and “used them to read internal logs between 12 and 19 November, after earlier probes of these endpoints from 5 November that returned no log content.” It identified the flaws as GHSA-v549-7j2x-qjm5 and GHSA-w5pf-xwjh-vr5v. “Our installation ran v0.121.1, while these advisories were patched in v0.141.1 and v0.142.1.”
SigNoz’s own advisories, both rated high severity, match those identifiers. GHSA-v549-7j2x-qjm5, also listed as CVE-2026-92729 and published on September 14, describes missing authentication on trace-funnel analytics endpoints and names v0.141.1 as the patch. GHSA-w5pf-xwjh-vr5v, also listed as CVE-2026-93292 and published on September 17, describes an authenticated ClickHouse SQL injection in trace-funnel analytics endpoints and names v0.142.1 as the patch. Both advisories list vulnerable ranges that include v0.121.1. That means both fixes had been public for about two months before the attacker began reading Fluidkey’s logs on November 12.
What was taken, and what Fluidkey says it has done
“Approximately $1.6 million was stolen from 52 accounts on Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Polygon, Optimism and Arbitrum.” That official total is close to Bitquery’s earlier unofficial estimate of at least $1.58 million, with a range of $1.58 million to $1.64 million, traced to wallets it tied to one attacker on the same six chains. The post-mortem figure is Fluidkey’s; Bitquery’s remains an unofficial estimate.
The 52 drained accounts are not the whole of the data exposure. Fluidkey’s review of the logs “includes 38 email addresses, 37 names, 17 bank account numbers (IBANs), 24 postal addresses, 4 dates of birth and 2 phone numbers, relating to 70 accounts.” The attacker also retrieved the viewing keys of 54 newly registered accounts. “A viewing key lets its holder see an account’s addresses, balances and transaction history. It cannot be used to move funds.” Fluidkey said on Sunday it had “contacted every affected user directly in the app and via email.”
Most of the stolen funds, the company said, were exchanged into ether and moved to Ethereum, and “approximately 887 ETH was deposited into a mixing service on the evening of 19 November.” It engaged zeroShadow, a blockchain investigations firm, and said the firm continues to trace the funds. It has reported the incident to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center and to the Swiss National Cyber Security Centre, and said it will file further criminal complaints in the jurisdictions concerned. The post-mortem does not say those funds have been recovered, and it does not announce a reimbursement plan.
Before the November 20 restore, Fluidkey said it ended all authenticated sessions, updated SigNoz to a version that fixes both vulnerabilities, rotated credentials, and took the query interface off the public internet. “Our servers now only accept a transfer request that is authorised with the user’s own key,” so a request “can no longer be created and approved with a session token alone.” Two-factor limit changes “now also verified on our servers.” “No session tokens and sensitive data are written to our logs.” A review of all third-party and self-hosted tools is “in progress.”
FAQ
Were users’ private keys stolen? Fluidkey said the private keys that control user funds never left users’ devices and have not been compromised. It described the attacker preparing transfers with session tokens and the app signing them when a user unlocked it.
Is the $1.6 million figure the same as the earlier $1.58 million estimate? No. Approximately $1.6 million is Fluidkey’s official total from 52 accounts. Bitquery’s earlier figure of at least $1.58 million was an unofficial on-chain estimate. The two are close but are not the same accounting.
Has the money been recovered, or have users been reimbursed? The post-mortem does not say so. Fluidkey said the investigation is ongoing, that about 887 ETH was sent to a mixing service, and that zeroShadow continues to trace the funds.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial advice.

















